



Global Cities & Terrorism Initiative

Uniting Against the Next Attack

• *Seeking Solutions* • *Sharing Answers*

2019 Colloquium

Project Hollow Square (working title)

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'A' Colloquium program

Executive summary

The UN CTED + CPOST 2019 colloquium held at the University of Chicago on 22 & 23 November 2019. With a total of 35 Delegates and 15 observers, representatives attending reflected the experience of various municipalities, including:

- Ankara
- Bali
- Boston
- Casablanca
- Chicago
- Dublin
- Eastbourne
- El Paso
- Glasgow
- London
- Paris
- Sydney
- Tel Aviv
- Washington DC

After short presentations on the first morning by Michèle Coninx, CTED, Russ Travers, US National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC), and CPOST researchers, all participants and experts were all invited to share experiences and insights through a series of moderated discussions. (See program Appendix 'A'.) The dynamics and style of the event encouraged open and frank discussions in Chatham House environment, in that personal commentary would be used but not attributed.

Through the discussions, it became clear that:

- Many smaller municipalities lacking resources to plan and protect against terrorist attacks easily become soft targets.
- There appears to be a communication disconnect between national counter-terrorism efforts and local municipal needs.
- Public-private partnership model could be more productive by including academia as a third element.
- The nature of attacks is changing, especially with the advent of social media terrorism, allowing attackers to launch local attacks on smaller municipalities and achieve a global effect.
- The availability of low-cost technology, such as drones, represents a clear threat of more sophisticated attacks limited only by the imagination of the attacker.
- According to a former ISIS recruiter, terrorists are “all looking for the next 9/11”.
- The combination of social media terrorism changing the geography of terrorism, freely available technology and the potential access to weapons of mass destruction, put an attack of catastrophic impact within reach of a small group or individual.
- Municipalities do not need more information or educational material; they need tools to use in proactive planning of response and resilience strategies.
- It is possible to group local municipalities to collaborate on planning and share local information, ideas and resources.

There is a fine line between spreading fear and sharing information.

The key is, however, as an African orator, Tajudeen Abdul Raheem, put it: “Don’t agonise, organise.”

One of the colloquium key aims was to develop a database to assist smaller municipalities to create scalable solutions to suit local needs.

Using a database on the day of an attack is unlikely, however, with the initial focus being on a rapid response.

Of far more use would be a database to feed into table-top exercises to assist in planning and preparation.

El Paso provided just such a detailed briefing in a minute-by-minute outline of an attack along with concerns about future threats. Gathering similar detail of past experiences of terrorist events would help understand what happens during the flow of the attack and the days just after.

Collecting data on how cities respond to attacks could be used to develop a toolkit for table-top exercises in other cities.

Boston, Glasgow, and Paris offered to provide a detailed account of attacks in their cities to begin gathering data. Other cities could provide similar data.

Products and commercial services could also be added, highlighting the need for public-private cooperation.

Building on the database would allow cities to identify the contacts, materials and solutions needed not only during an attack but in the aftermath. Smaller municipalities could also develop relationships neighbouring municipalities through joint exercises to help combined planning, coordination, and response.

Although applying the lessons of past attacks to present situations is essential — many concepts and principles of the attacks do not change — it is equally important to understand the creative element of attacks.

An emerging threat combination would be a drone attack to deliver WMD in a smaller municipality, while live-streaming either via remote cameras or suicide terrorists.

Alternatively, there is the scenario whereby an individual or small group could use drone technology carrying a payload of explosives to attack multiple critical infrastructure points, such as data centers, power grid locations, or airport scenarios, not necessarily equipped to a level of redundancy able provide a resilient response. For example, they may have the capacity to recover from an attack on a single site and not multiple, simultaneous attacks.

Ultimately, a database could help develop table-top exercises based on worse-case scenarios to assist soft targets to plan for potential attacks and develop improved resilience outcomes.

Recommendations

The colloquium resulted in recommending the following steps:

1. Create a database — working title ‘Hollow Square’ — populated with:
 - a. Past experiences from a minimum of five cities;
 - b. Information and material relating to solutions, equipment and standards
 - c. Advice on integrating the database in table-top exercises.
2. Develop a minimum viable database to be launched in June 2020 in New York, including:
 - a. Half-day launch event outlining the database content and use;
 - b. A one-day colloquium to test assumptions and usability.
3. Run table-top exercise in November 2020, with El-Paso proposed as a venue, utilising the database and testing its use before launching the complete database.
4. Develop a program of regional colloquiums along the lines of the Chicago event to develop the database further and provide municipalities practical assistance in designing scalable response and resilience.

Project Hollow Square

A hollow square was large infantry square Roman legions utilized to defend in all directions. The Hollow Square database will equip soft targets with practical data and tools to develop their own hollow square.



UN CTED + CPOST Colloquium 2019 notes

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Day 1, Nov. 22, 2019

Session 1

Michèle Coninx, Assistant Secretary-General & Executive Director, United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED):

- Whole of society approach, cooperation at the local/regional/national/international levels simultaneously
- Solidarity amongst terrorist groups (need to respond with our own alliances)
- Weaponization of AI, social media, the web, drones
- Problems are the responsibility of everyone (not just private, academic, or public sector)
- Foreign terrorist fighters returning to their home countries (some with terrorist intent)
- “Reintegrating the enemy within”
- Problem of terrorism is the new norm
- CTED’s scope covers all CVE measures
- 2178 (2014) 2396 (2017), 2341 UN Security Council resolutions work to protect soft targets
- Call on delegates to engage in public-private partnership to respond, investigate, counter terrorist attacks (national, regional, international levels)
- UN action plans to protect religious sites, help states with security framework required for hosting large-scale international events

Russell “Russ” Travers, Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC):

- NCTC model is an approach that others could replicate (facilitation of information sharing between departments)
- Halle; German city with attempted synagogue attack highlights four challenges with the type of terrorism we are seeing today: 1. Size of city (can be small; we can’t just protect large cities) 2. Target type (there are thousands of religious institutions which must be protected, for example) 3. Technology misuse by terrorists 4. Innovative use of technology (3D printing example) 5. Ideology (increasing “racially motivated” extremism) 6. Detection problem of radicalization (puts pressure on cities trying to keep soft targets safe)
- Whole society rather than just at the federal level
- Federal level: horizontal organization to facilitate inter-agency relationships: Prevention; Domestic terrorism problem
- Vertical: capacity building (progress hard to gauge, but Kenyan response to two different attacks shows some signs of improvement)
 1. Horizontal at NCTC: run exercises at state localities to get everyone together to walk through scenarios; joint counterterrorism assessment team brought into NCTC to analyze examples
 2. Prevention: more radicalized people in the world today than 15/16 years ago, but there is a power in bystanders (the vast majority of terrorist attacks are known by at least one person before they are committed): how to get them to go to law authority--putting out resources for them
 3. Engagement with the tech sector: informing them as to how their platforms are being used in nefarious ways (important to note that we’ve still come a long way)

- Priority on resilience: terrorism is not existential in nature, but terrorist threat is evolving so we need to as well

Discussion between Prof. Robert Pape and Russ Travers

- P: Are we seeing a return of publicity as the number one motive of terrorism?
- T: Not necessarily outstripping other motives.
- P: How can you apply trusted information sharing to medium or small sized cities? What are the challenges?
- T: Information sharing is easy with big cities that are especially rich in resources, however it is incumbent on the federal government to provide context to any type of partner so that localities can understand what the national level is thinking about in terms of standards.
- P: Response to El Paso sufficient?
- T: Non-Islamist terrorism previously not the focus of the NCTC, this is a global movement but its scale is currently unknown, global technology makes it easier for right wing terrorists to work with one another, global connections in the right wing movement are the purview of the NCTC
- P: Does the wide availability of weapons make it easier to move from radicalization to mobilization for terrorists in the US? Greater engagement with academia?
- T: Some collaboration with academia already happening (i.e. Germans with program to look at social factors, algorithms which shrink the “haystack” of potential perpetrators we need to look at). There are legal complications which come from sharing information on the American public with non-governmental actors (one exception would be Moonshot CVE which looks at Google search hotspots and results can be made available to different country consumers.
- P: Narrow our focus to attacker produced material?
- T: Designating political organizations as terrorist groups brings with it a host of problems: need to distinguish between legitimately terrorist organizations and possible right-wing leaning groups.

CPOST Research Presentation

Keven Ruby, Ph.D, + Researchers

Research Director, University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST)

Researchers: Julia Lodoen, Rahma Bayrakdar, Sedef Ishaque, Alexandra Chinchilla, Bettina Hammer

Wendin Smith, PhD, Managing Director, Deloitte Consulting LLP:

- We need both preparations to counter a WMD, threat *and* the ability to recover from one should it happen.
- Mechanism of WMDs has diversified, thus so has the threat: higher probability of a high-risk scenario
- For example, ISIS has indigenous ability to develop a chemical weapon
- The worst-case example is that non-state actors would develop them
- Private sector has technology, data, analytics to support the government in these capacities
- Ricin example: the private sector stopped the terrorist from following through with his plot (Amazon noticed his purchasing pattern)
- Importance in public-private relationship: cooperation vs. compelling of partners
- Ideas for deterring WMD terrorism

- Drawing power of professional services/technology to address public sector problems
- In social media age, in moment of attack there needs to be a trusted source of reliable information, responsibility to develop programs is at the federal level because small municipalities don't have the capacity to do so themselves

Session 2:

Lessons Learned 1

Conversation with Dr Göktuğ Sönmez, Director of Security Studies, Middle Eastern Studies Center (ORSAM), Turkey, Omar Filal, Governor Casablanca Prefecture, Morocco, and Patrick Butor, Administrateur General, French Cabinet du Secetaire General

- Moderator: We've had the helicopter briefing, now the work begins. Goal is to gather ideas for a database; minimal product of a database by June 2020 for UN in New York. We have representatives from major cities, geography of terrorism is shifting towards small towns, scale down large-city solutions to smaller municipal levels
- Sönmez: I teach Middle Eastern politics and security studies for military and civilians, mostly focusing on terrorism (both al Qaeda, far-left and far-right).
- Filal: Since 1994, Morocco has had attacks in Marrakech up until 2007. Morocco developed counterterrorism measures in 2003 to take a more proactive approach.
- Butor: I'm not in charge of Paris, but for the Paris region, we had many attacks in the country last year. For two years, none in Paris. We have a new phenomenon, not terrorism, but big demonstrations, with people only involved in looting. Developed new police force to counter this. After Charlie Hebdo, we had special police forces that can be anywhere in half an hour. Macron appealed to vigilance.
- Moderator: How is terrorism changing the nature of your city?
- Filal: Moroccan citizens are sensitive since 2005... we have to make sure negative views don't impact citizens or views of security. We don't want to incite panic. Terrorism does not have a profile; terrorism is within us...We create jobs, so citizens are not vulnerable to terror groups.
- Sönmez: PKK attacks claimed 15k lives, half of which were civilians. ISIS killed 300 in a train station. Turkey is experienced. Effective measures established after 2013. Active risk assessment units in 16 provinces and 13,000 people analyzed in these units. Published 2 reports focusing on ISIS, on exploitation of religion 2015 and 2017. 550 preachers are responsible for prisoners' deradicalization, and now there's a dynamic security approach. Prevention of future crimes, but also psych support and moral training for reintegration. Minister of Justice and EU carry this out. Domestic violence and drug addiction also go under this program. Also, HS schoolers are educated on terrorism, domestic violence, and drug addiction too. There is a mechanism biweekly for neighborhood rep and police and military leaders to meet together, so the leaders can see each segment of the country. Prevented a suicide attack by recognizing a foreigner (Iraqi) then informed the police and they interdicted bomb making.
- Moderator: Public response is engaging more?
- Sönmez: there is more sensitivity to attacks now. We completed report on media coverage... now media is more sensitive. PKK targeted bus stations, ISIS a train station...but Turkey is experienced so there's not much change in people's daily lives.
- Moderator: Social media??

- Sönmez: Policy is effective at intercepting deep and dark web. Hundreds of attacks foiled in the last few years. Both arms and drug deals discovered. People beyond 30 still rely on traditional media. Police are active at removing terror content from Twitter and Facebook. PKK is moving to telegram, but it's getting more difficult to monitor these attacks, same with ISIS.
- Moderator: Social media?? [directed at Omar]
- Filal: We have strict monitoring and followup to content on social media. We can use social media to enlighten about true Islam. Morocco has been more vigilant after 2003. There has been sharing of intelligence down to the local level. They have taken appropriate measures...truly integrated approach that is dynamic and adapts to the modus operandi of terrorists.
- Moderator: You must have invested a lot in that.
- Filal: The way it is organized in Morocco, there are 17 governors...they are depositories of the information. There are administrative annexes. There is collaboration with police and security services. Monitoring law means since 2002, 200 terrorist cells (70 Daesh, including 19 in 2019) which means 3000 arrested, 400 plots foiled. 1600 moroccans who joined ISIS (225 former inmates, 700 died in Iraq or Syria). This means we have to continue investing because threat is ongoing. Proximity between people and government help build relationships. Represents state in very specific area on the ground.
- Moderator: How did you build that trust?
- Filal: Essentially linked with nature of Moroccan regime. You have a state representative on the ground, and this builds trust by resolving issues. All the reforms and social, economic, religious measures have improved trust.
- Moderator: Economic affect after an attack?
- Butor: Big effect, worldwide renown, (20% cancellation of tourism annual loss), There was strong national reaction, lots of demonstrations and flag waving. Special migrant districts where Muslim Brotherhood is powerful.
- Sönmez: ISIS and AQ have expanded to Asia. Concerned about WMD attacks. Somez was in northern Iraq, when jihadists made a chemical attack. WMD issues are of concern. 1000 SDF suspects (1/3 women, children) held in Turkey. New projects: 150 projects by Youth ministry, youth camps (improve ethnic relations) and 4million Syrian refugees in Turkey. Monitoring of emails is occurring. 188 children (orphans) are being integrated back into society. Social media (post-attack comm strategies) are another avenue to pursue for the database.

Lessons Learned 2

***Conversation with: Shumeane Benford, Director, Boston Office of Emergency Management
Gillies Crichton, Head of Assurance, Glasgow Airport, and Dr Petrus Golose, Inspector General Bali Police.***

- General: Commissioner of 13k police in Bali, commander of task force since 2002, 13 years in counterterrorism now.
- Gilles Crichton: In charge of risk at Glasgow airport in the UK, had a terrorist attack in 2007.
- Benford: Emergency management for Boston (coordination of EMS in crises whether manmade or otherwise). Manages federal funds...fusion centers are another way we want to share information. We are exclusively Boston area.
- Moderator: [To Benford] Is there a flow of information from feds like money?

- Benford: Money goes to state, then to regions, we are the only urban area initiative though. Has come a long way through fusion centers and Public-private partnerships. Have to account for federal, private, local partners.
- Moderator: Gilles, how does that partnership work for you?
- Crichton: Prior to incident, (Scotland didn't have terrorism, false sense of security since IRA never targeted them) A lot of effort was spent communicating with police, fire, and medical services. Threat assessments were given which paid dividends. We had to work with local partners to get things back up and running. Perpetrators had to be brought to justice and airport back up and running, so had to be at table as equal partner with local authorities otherwise they couldn't reopen. Have to be in partnerships, that's vitally important.
- Crichton: Danny effect. Danny, an engineer, was equipped with company credit card and authority to do what was needed. Help Emergency services to help us. Trying to get passengers back, processed through terminal. Danny had to paint windows to prevent public seeing crime scene in order to evacuate passengers while keeping crime scene uncompromised. All of this within 24 hours because of availability of local partnerships.
- Moderator: Australian tourism is vital part of economy; terror would be bad. Can you talk us through sharing info with Aussies?
- General: 2002 and 2005 were first terror attacks. Did not have yet a counterterrorism center or special forces for counterterrorism. In 2002, we started building counterterrorism task force. We worked with Aussies, US, Japan. Jama'a al Islamiyah is problem since 11 million are associated with radicals. We learned how to work together with Australia and learned about Jama'a al Islamiyya. The tourism from Australia and other countries decreased substantially after 2002. Almost every year there was a terrorist attack. Arrested 2000 terrorists and then engage them in the deradicalization program, but they still attempted to engage in terrorism. Trying together with stakeholders to cooperate to deal with the 5% of Muslims who are terrorists. Many terrorist groups exist. The suicide bombers look for the police specifically. In response, the community starts movement "We are not afraid" and demonstrate community engagement against terrorism. Security forces are now allowed to arrest suspects before they complete the attack, based on surveillance, legally. Can arrest without trial for 21 days, after 2002. Difficult to do this with parliament, but data convinced them.
- Moderator: Your cooperation with Australia, was it personal?
- General: We are close with friends from Australia and US. Friend-to-friend contact was important. Easy for me to contact Australian commissioners, talking with FBI counterparts. Social media: Can block social media legally and have shut down telegram channels...now in talks with telegram CEO. Or, can slow down the internet (as they did during a 200k people demonstration).
- Moderator: [Question to Crichton]
- Crichton: One of the examples is return on capital on fire trucks versus retail. Not a level playing field. Fire truck is a worse return on capital than the retail investment. So we turn it around by calling it a return on risk. What's the risk of \$700k not given to fire department? Won't be able to maintain designated airfield and so less planes land and more money lost. So, the benefit of this analysis is that it provides this alternative framework instead of return on capital.
- Benford: Challenge of terrorism is so broad; you can get overwhelmed by preps for potential threats. We are potentially exposed in some areas. We can learn from each other and build relationships to confront threats. Like Bellichek said, "do your job" because other stakeholders have to rely on you. Think tanks need to provide data, and policymakers have

to operationalize that information. We need to send out positive messages to the business community and to our constituents.

Lessons Learned Summary

This session aimed for formulating scalable solutions for possible terror attacks in smaller towns. Shifting focus from major cities to small, local or municipal level was emphasized. The session included representative from six cities namely: Ankara, Casablanca, Paris, Boston, Bali and Glasgow. Representative from Ankara emphasized the experience of Turkey due to recurring terror attacks as Turkey experienced 14 major terror attacks from ISIS alone. In the attack prevention front, the representative gave an overview of the prevention strategies of institutions such as the Directorate of Migration Management, Ministry of Religious Affairs and crisis management institutions in towns along the Syrian border.

For example, the Ministry of Religious Affairs actively produces preaches about religious extremism and exploitation of religion to counter ISIS propaganda. As many as 550 preachers provide moral support and moral training for prisoners. Moreover, meetings take place every two weeks that include neighbourhood representatives, military and police personnel and high school directorates. While emphasizing the police presence in the dark web and the deep web in terms of terror propaganda, the representative mentioned the enduring influence of traditional media outlets such as newspapers and TV. Finally, he directed attention at the shift of ISIS presence from social media towards Telegram use.

Representative from Casablanca talked about a proactive approach as opposed to a reactive approach to terrorism prevention. He mentioned the importance of trust between local communities and government agents working in the field. According to him, this trust is based on the socioeconomic and religious measures provided by the Moroccan regime as well as the ways in which the government officials operate on the ground.

Parisian representative talked about the importance of rapid police response. He mentioned that ever since the Charlie Hebdo attack, the police have a response rate of 30 minutes after an attack takes place. Moreover, the representative talked about the importance of a strong national reaction against terror attacks with widespread demonstrations taking place after the 2015 ISIS attack.

Representative from Bali was the Commissioner of Bali Police Force and his presentation was named Securing JAKARTA City Remembrance of Thamrin St attack 14/1. The commissioner stated that Bali did not have a counter terrorism office until after the first Bali bombing in 2002 and that they recruited personnel from other government agencies during this time. He underlined the importance of building international networks of cooperation while maintaining focus on internal capacity building. He mentioned how the current attacks differ from the earlier ones as the recent attacks shifted target from tourists to government representatives such as police officers. One of the counter-terrorism measures that the commissioner emphasized was a change in the law that enabled arrest and detention of suspected perpetrators for up to 21 days before a terror attack has taken place.

Representative from Glasgow Airport mentioned the importance of public private partnerships as Scotland's lack of terrorism experience necessitates coordination, partnership and interaction between different stakeholders. One way to show resilience against terror attacks, the representative said, is to partner up with both public and private actors in times of crisis. Similarly, representative from Boston emphasized the importance of building public private partnerships to coordinate and share information for emergency management services in crisis situations.

Better Living Through Security

Conversation with: Graham Ellis, Assistant Commissioner, Operational Resilience / Special Operations Group, London Fire Brigade, Lieutenant Patrick T. Quinn, Chicago Police Department, Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC), Daniel R. William, FBI Chicago Field Office

1. Graham Ellis: emergency first responder services are engaged in the fight against both extreme right-wing attacks and international terrorism
 - a. Domestic terrorism as well as extreme right wing is an emerging threat to London
 - b. These security units plan, train, and respond together to foster resilience
 - i. Attackers are likely to become more desperate in the future because of past resilience by security forces
2. Patrick Quinn on Crime Prevention and Information Center:
 - a. At this center they look at everything from a Chicago nexus and then branch out
 - i. This means that first they consider how the information will affect Chicago and then how the information will affect the state level and possibly the national level
 - ii. They are responsible for getting information and giving it to entities that rely on the information so that these entities can make operational decisions
 - iii. Their main goal is to be preventative in these actions
 - iv. All of these aspects are incorporated together in this Fusion Center concept
 1. The Fusion Center was born out of the 9/11 commission report
 2. The commission report found out that there were breakdowns in communication between state local and government officials leading up to the attack
 3. The Fusion Center was created to put all the stakeholders together and allow them to effectively share information
 4. Use the fusion center to direct towards crime prevention efforts locally
 5. This sharpens skills if there was a terrorist attack
3. Dan Williams, FBI:
 - a. Joint Terrorism Task Force = several agency working in FBI space in order to mitigate threats
 - i. Disrupt prior to successful attacks
 - ii. When an incident occurs, there is a state of confusion post-incident because there are many responders who are eager to help
 - iii. This causes misinformation to the public, which elongates solving the problem
 - b. Strategic cooperation with other sectors to create plans for times of threat to complement one another
4. Ellis: "It's not about learning to dance at the ball, it's about knowing who you're dancing with and going to dance practice"
 - a. Communication with smaller towns in order to create a proper plan; you must practice the plans as well
 - b. When you do not have misinformation, you can confirm the number of casualties and other imminent threats
 - c. He hopes to minimize the confusion with a well thought out plan pre-event
 - d. What's important is understanding agency authorities as a command post
 - e. They organize table-top exercises and identify who should be there if something were to happen

- f. Having friendships and broad networks of connection helps entities work together
- 5. Quinn: Consistent personnel that report to duty, develop a trust factor with one another in order to share information efficiently
 - a. Know what each group can contribute to the end goal
 - b. Interacting with private security companies: outreach is a major fusion center component, but is not the top priority (not necessarily the right way to do things)
 - c. At the fusion center they bring everyone in and ask questions about what you can contribute to the main goal
 - d. These relationships have to be built before a threat occurs
 - e. There are so many sectors and so many people who want to be involved in the fight, and it is difficult to create consistent relationships
- 6. Ellis: Project Griffin in the UK: security industry contributes to assuring public security
 - a. Having eyes and ears for the police (security guards who report to the police) will allow for a safer community even when there is not an appropriate ratio of police to people
 - b. Project Ascend: Special Forces training for a terrorist attack
 - i. Testing the response of private security
- 7. Public-private partnerships, Dan William: the FBI manages and directs private sector relationships. It is difficult to decide what information to gather and disseminate. Using intelligence to give resources when there are threats. There is a finite number of resources, so the FBI needs to evaluate, by looking at past threats as well as potential future threats, where to distribute resources.
 - a. JTTF underscores the law enforcement private sector relationship
 - b. The counterterrorism department can gain a certain level of cooperation because of their role as a preventative force. They are an intelligence gathering entity
 - c. They are most focused on where they stage their resources to protect consistent threats and engage with new threats
 - d. Intelligence is their currency. Thus, they value success through information they collect. They don't care about the arrests.
 - e. FBI Counterterrorism hosts periodic meetings where they notify other agencies and departments of the threats, they have identified so people see the risks from their perspective
 - f. Once they analyze all the intelligence, they have collected they rank what is most important nationally and regionally etc. This ranking process is how they allocate resources
 - g. The real challenge is when dealing with the private sector and different parts of the law enforcement community you have to make sure you are moving the information to the right entity and that you are not discounting any information
 - h. One counter-terrorism strategy can even begin with teaching individuals to approach people in an effective way to find out whether they are supposed to be there or not
 - i. This starts with a proper understanding of how valuable all intelligence is
 - ii. Individuals need to let the decision makers decide what information is important. If you keep the information because you think it is not important entities will not have access to.
 - iii. They try to get everyone (public and private entities) in the same room but it's like herding cats

Case Study: Responding Not Reacting

Brian Hanson, Vice President for Research, Chicago Council on Global Affairs talked with representatives from Tel Aviv, Bg (Ret) Roey Elcabets, Tel Aviv-Yafo City Councilman, and David Aharony, Director of the Municipal Emergency and Security Department.

1. Hanson hopes to address the discussion of experience around the world of responding not reacting to terrorist events
2. The National and Tel Aviv government work together to eliminate threats
 - a. There has been a recent shift in the types of threats that people are experiencing
 - i. Israel is preparing for all types of threats, including natural disasters.
 - Main threats in Tel Aviv: missile attacks, suicide bombs, border threats (penetration in the South would mean that they could get to Tel Aviv in a few hours), ground terror attacks (usually trying to attack soldiers)
 - b. Response in 15 seconds in Tel Aviv, in the area surrounding Gaza the response is within 15 minutes
 - c. He believes that if you prepare yourself for the worst case you are ready for many kinds of threats
3. Six principles that guide response to threats
 - a. Immediate Response Security individuals have no time to waste
 - b. Cooperation
 - i. The Army and the Police sit together to ensure that all of the information is coming to the municipality
 - ii. With cooperation comes practical problems – ego, both personal and organizational. To combat this ego there are lots of efforts to clarify who the managers are and to clarify the value of cooperation to the shared mission. These entities really have no choice but to cooperate.
 - iii. The first level of cooperation is the international level of cooperation every day they are working together
 - In this case it is very important to identify the situation
 - Mutual enemy = mutual problem
 - iv. If it's a small event the police will govern and take control of the situation and if it's a big even the Homefront command will work to save lives, but the city will still govern city operations (an example of the municipality and Homefront command working together)
 - v. There needs to be unity and clarity of chain of command in every situation
 - vi. then there is a clear commander for each problem it solves the problem of ego
 - c. Solving problems always starts with the police because they are staying in the city for 24 hours 7 days a week and then the police cooperate with the army when they need additional forces
 - i. There are missile attacks coming in with little warning they need to ensure that they can communicate effectively
 - ii. The army explains to the citizens how to protect themselves
 - d. The second level of this explanation is when the municipality explains to the citizens immediately
 - e. The fourth principle is the immediate information sharing announcement which they often do in minutes following an attack
 - i. one of the most important things to protect the people is to ensure that they know when and how to go to the bomb shelters
 - ii. This idea is that one should not wait until something happens explaining and preventing is part of their life

- iii. communication in the age of social media is particularly important individuals can use social media to raise a red flag in minutes. There is constant media dialogue.
 - iv. rumors are rampant with social media in general; however, rumors are rare in regard to threats on Tel Aviv because everyone understands that people should be alert
 - v. Channels that disseminate information on potential threats (WhatsApp, Facebook, emergency line) are very serious, so rumored threats are rare
 - vi. Sometimes the mayor speaks with the residents about attacks because it can be better than sending a message
 - vii. The army explains to the citizens how to protect themselves, and the municipalities will explain to their citizens what to do in the event of an attack
 - viii. everyday there is a cyber-attack in Tel Aviv part of the system is to let information about these attacks go to the public but also sometimes with cyber-attacks you need to protect citizens and cannot share information with them
 - ix. In regard to the Government and the private sector when there is cyberattacks how does the Tel Aviv government work with the private sector?
 - x. There is a national entity that deals with cyberattacks
 - xi. The intelligence agencies get instructions for the national level about how to protect individuals against cyberattacks and then these agencies translate this information to the municipality level
- f. Flexible response
- i. In real life you have to find the right solution to address the real context
 - ii. To do this, you must trust your strength and educate people in real time
 - iii. Individuals have to be willing to trust the officer in charge to be innovative
- g. The citizen is at the center of all of this. If you think through the eyes of the citizens in regard to attacks its very valuable
- i. For example, if you want your employees to come to work there needs to be somewhere where their children can go if the schools are shut down. (b) Resilience is very important for the citizens in Israel
 - ii. Security officials look at attack through the eyes of the people – one must speak with these citizens to understand. Children have a lot of trauma and the security individuals and those in government need to focus on how they can they help the community
 - iii. Preparation and training is important to minimize trauma
 - iv. There is both a hard aspect and a soft aspect of countering terrorism-one must save lives and help those that live with the trauma

Session 4

Scalable solutions: Standards as a tool

Discussion with Chris Hasbrook, Vice President and General Manager of the Building and Life Safety Technologies Division of UL LLC, Patrick Butor, Administrateur General, French Cabinet du Secetaire General, Paul McCarthy, Global Security Architect, Amazon Web Services.

Moderator: What is being done in terms of developing standards?

Butor:

- Standards are people merging from different countries, saying what is best, state of the art
- If you want good quality, you need business continuity, for business continuity you need security
- After the Paris attack, discussing standard security plans for small business
- Creating barriers for vehicles
- Standard of resistance for special clothes for policemen against riots
- Use of video surveillance

Moderator: Who is working on these standards with you?

Butor:

- Open to everyone
- Six countries involved: Australia, Korea, Britain, United States, Germany, (missed last one?)
- Working on getting more countries involved
 - Egyptian representative

Moderator: How long have you been spending on this so far

Butor: Two years or three years

Moderator: After you write the standard, how do you let people know about it?

Butor: They are well known at the corporate level

Moderator: How do we let small businesses know about this standard, can they pay for it?

Butor: People can learn how to incorporate them

Hasbrook:

- Standards are privately made, but you want them open to public involvement
- Standards can be made very quickly if made publicly

Moderator: There are some you don't want to make public

Hasbrook:

- There are certain levels of standards
- Low level: toasters, smoke detectors
- High level communication systems are on the next level
- Final level: restricted level: national security monitoring standard

Moderator: Walk us through what standards look like for your organization, how are they made concrete?

Hasbrook:

- There are standards called out as part of building code
- Example: fire alarm standards carried out by firemen and fire marshalls

Moderator: It strikes me that there's lots of people selling equipment like CCTVs, alarm systems. The problem is that a country might buy equipment from three or four different countries. How would you overcome that program?

Hasbrook:

- They do talk to each other if they are designed to talk to each other
- When you adopt a good set of standards, they are tested as a system and work together

- Essentially, you could choose different versions and they will talk to each other.

Moderator: How well recognized in UL beyond UK, Aus, US?

Hasbrook:

- UL mark is accepted in Australia, Hong Kong, Europe, South America
- Can be a testing organization for standards that are not UL's own

Moderator: Can you walk us through your day job and standards as a management tool?

McCarthy:

- Involved with International Shipping and Port Security Standard before Amazon
 - Helping other countries protect port security
- Interagency cooperation huge problem throughout Asia and Middle East
- Need regular meetings between all stakeholders
- Used standard as a framework to bring parties together and create a common goal
- Able to unite agencies who hadn't collaborated in years, creates common buy in

Moderator:: What about the problem of compliance?

McCarthy:

- Need to educate on standards for them to be effective
- Example: Malaysian port with a lot of security next door to a port with minimal security
- When you create a standard, you need to create an education system around it

Hasbrook:

- UL now works with companies to provide training and push compliance

McCarthy:

- We constantly have to check for gaps with everything improving and changing
- Developed CCTV standard because of failures to install cameras correctly, missing important footage

Moderator: A lot of people who sell the cameras and buy them don't know what they're talking about.

McCarthy: That's true.

Scalable solutions: Information sharing Bruce Schwartz, US DoJ, and Paddy McGuinness, former UK Government National Security Advisor.

Moderator: Something we've been hearing all day is a need for sharing information. What does information sharing look like in your world?

Schwartz:

- Starts at the street level, one of the key aspects is making sure we have community-based policing, police get information from citizens
- DOJ does overseas capacity building, one of the key things is information sharing at the police level, developing a policing system that has community trust
- Second key is making use of INTERPOL, critical counterterrorism tool
- Next key is internal information sharing within each country
 - Among law enforcement agencies (federal and local)
 - Break down barriers between police and prosecutors, try to create police and prosecutorial task forces
 - Break down barriers between law enforcement and national security/intelligence
- Need to be able to share internationally
 - Mutual legal assistance project for international sharing of evidence
- Scale of information sharing goes from street to international connections

Moderator: Is breaking down that wall a good thing?

McGuinness:

- Good thing
- Why was the anglophone network of the Islamic state broken up by military and police and francophone network was not?
 - Anglophones able to put together the whole thing from the locality up the chain (i.e. policing in Birmingham working with federal agencies, joint military capability, international partnerships)
 - Belgian federal government not in communication with local police from Molenbeek
- Something significant about counterterrorism from the local level
- In other European countries, local and federal police don't share information
- Need to have consent from community when surveilling and gathering information
- There are certain categories of information that must not be spread broadly (i.e. where information comes from)
- Need to have minimum number of things that can't be shared, and standards for handling secret information
- UK has set up counterterrorism systems based on attacks that have happened throughout Europe

Moderator: At a municipal level, do they have the skills to keep certain information classified? On a municipal level, how should they be thinking about information?

Schwartz:

- Information on returning foreign fighters was initially not being shared
- Now, working to push this information out
- It isn't enough to talk about what information we have on these people from Syria and Iraq, we need to know information on them from their communities
 - Gathering information from above and below

McGuinness:

- A way of thinking about this is thinking about how we reintegrate these people into our societies (returners)
- Need to think about child services in the locality as serving children of returners
- Need to think on the local level of reintegrating returners

Schwartz:

- Need to think about nontraditional sources of information (i.e. Yazidi refugee groups)
- Germany has pioneered the path in this by prosecuting woman married to ISIS fighters

Moderator: How do we rationalize people being afraid of government taking data but not Facebook

Bruce:

- We can't break the nexus
- Important to do targeted collection and test collection methods
- These methods will be tested in court; therefore, it is important to allow intelligence information to be produced in such a way that a defendant can challenge it

McGuinness:

- We need to know what is happening on social media, understand what radicalizers are doing and what tech companies are doing about it
- We need a kind of UL for the tech companies
- Don't want intelligence agencies looking through this social media data
 - Waste of time and money
- Thus, we need to hold social media platforms to account in a way that has public consent

Schwartz:

- Two things to keep in mind: data protection issues, end to end encryption will prevent analysis

Moderator: Do you want to finish on any thought?

McGuiness:

- Technology risk and opportunity. The rate of change is rapid.
- Need to put in place protocols and system with the foresight that these things will change
- Need to be able to exchange pattern data (patterns of behavior from CCTV used in machine learning)

Day 2, Nov. 23, 2019

Session 1

Case Study: Facing an Attack: El Paso's city response to terror, presented by Jorge Rodriguez, Deputy Chief/Emergency Management Coordinator, El Paso City/County Office of Emergency.

Also present: Dionne Mack, Deputy City Manager, Public Safety, El Paso and Mario D'Agostino, Fire Chief, El Paso

Overview of the El Paso region (video)- Paso Del Norte (includes Juarez, Mexico).

- 2.7 million people across 4 counties
- The Urban Island, facts involving diversity, security, workforce and international ports of entry.
 - Emphasis on number and type of security forces

Introduction, cities in region

- Texas, densely populated
- El Paso serves as the sole regional provider for critical resources/infrastructure and specialized teams

Unique Risks and Vulnerabilities

- Urban island: El Paso is regionally isolated from other major cities, it is a challenge to get resources quickly from other cities, non-funded UASI
- Border Proximity: 47 miles of shared border, less than ½ mile separation between El Paso and Juarez
 - Juarez has high rates of crime and violence (cartel wars)
 - Different visualizations of proximity
 - Drone problem: "rogue drones" pose threat because they are easy to buy, can reach critical infrastructure in the El Paso region, and carry explosives or cartel products
 - UTEP students develop skynet (Air Ops Branch) to monitor "rogue" drones
 - International boundary does not insulate El Paso from cross border threats such as terrorism, Hazmat release, pandemics, and drug violence
 - Via ports of entry, movement of goods and people

El Paso and Migration, 2019

- Influx of migrant apprehensions beginning in January with fewer releases
 - Many came seeking asylum from Nicaragua, Guatemala
- Complexities
 - Similarities to a disaster
 - Federal issue, local problem
 - Family units
 - Use of public funds
 - Secondary impact to homeland security
 - How to balance the humanitarian and border security aspects

El Paso Shooting, 8/3

- Timeline of Walmart shooting
 - Manifesto posted 10:15, calls of shooting at 10:39, officers arrive 10:45, ambulances arrive 10:52, shooter apprehended 11:03 (within 24 minutes)
- Challenges: Walmart was within a larger shopping complex, phantom calls reported additional shooters, worry of Boston-style manhunt
- Responses:
 - MacArthur School designated family reunification center
 - Local community foundation set up a victim's fund to direct public willingness to assist
 - planning for vigils
 - set up a family assistance center
 - Arrival of president to visit hospitals and meet with first responders
- The emergency response team stayed activated for 13 days following the shooting to deal with vigil security, POTUS visit – then El Paso shifted to longterm response mode
- Shooter targeted El Paso in manifesto because of large Hispanic population and developments in migrant crisis

Community recovery post-shooting

- Shooting was a huge blow to the public psyche because El Paso has been a top 10 safest city for over a decade
- Not much in emergency management doctrine for long term recovery, resilience
 - Oversight assistance from Las Vegas
- Established the Recovery Policy Group
 - Consists of 8 work groups: donations, resiliency center, responder support, finance, grants, after action, community behavioral health, memorial
 - (Added by El Paso) community behavioral health workgroup, memorial workgroup

What shaped El Paso's ability to respond during the crisis?

- Complex coordinated terrorist attack exercise (Oct 2018) -- group already organized
- POTUS Rally (Feb 2019) -- special events planning in place
- Special Events Workgroup
- Migrant Crisis – partnerships with nonprofits

Evolving Threats: what threats does El Paso still face today?

- Terrorism (military bases)
- Domestic terrorism
- Open borders/anti-immigration agitators
- Narco-terrorism (developing) – El Paso would be an easy target for

Eyes forward

- El Paso learned from other cities who have faced emergency security situations
- Paying it forward: the knowledge must be captured and disseminated
- Emergency management can handle these events in the moment, but the nation needs to develop a long-term recovery framework

Session 2

Scalable solutions: Public Communications

**Discussion with George Little, Brunswick Group, Brian Jenner, UK Speechwriter's Guild, Ted Souder, Google, Col. James M. Wolfenbarger (Ret.), Director - N.A. Intel-Led Public Safety Team
Motorola Solutions**

Public communications are vital in managing terror and other security crises.

Q: (to George), who do you need to be talking to in event of attack?

- Every audience matters: important to convey sense of resilience and confidence and a sense of longterm solutions to every audience. Communicator should stay calm/collected, deliver as much information as you can
- Best communication happens at the state and local levels, because of proximity to community
- Communication should be prioritized, played important part in bin Laden raid – communicators need to be involved at the decision-making stages so that they are well-informed

Q: (to George) How are communicators equipped to deal with bad news (Stereotype of the spin doctor)?

- Yes - at state/local level, communicators are in the loop and effective at relating to the community. Expertise matters, be it knowing how to relate to the local community or knowing a lot about a specific subject

Q: (to George) Companies like Brunswick are expensive, not everyone can afford --

- There are ways to scale: smaller municipalities can band together and split the costs (different ways of modelling costs make services affordable to different communities)
- Partnerships between large cities and smaller cities are important in event of significant terrorist attack: can help train communications officers in mid-small cities who might be overwhelmed, can supply resources to help support the crisis response (Emphasis on creating multi-city partnerships and coordination efforts)
- Communications response needs to be rehearsed too

Q: (to Jim)

- Corporate sector can help control and frame the conversation on ethical use of AI, responsible use of data and application of algorithms, etc. so that big data doesn't seem so nefarious
- Precipice of change on 911 technology, better framework and infrastructure
- Corporate sector should partner with state/local authorities to provide resources, so that state/local doesn't fall too far behind the power curve

(Ted responds)

- Why not combine communication strategy and data? Role of chief storyteller to use data and resources available to create a narrative based on fact/data, using the power of the cloud, that alerts government agencies about what's going on

- Cities create a lot of data; Google and other companies need to make cloud computing platforms available to cities/towns/municipalities so that they can capitalize on them
- Partnerships with local education institutions

Q (to Brian)

- The catastrophe speech, organize conferences where speechwriters describe what its like to write such a speech, need for rapid response, how essential it was to be isolated
- Need authentic and emotional response, need to be prepared, look at examples, need to operate as quickly as possible to reassert authority of leaders and the state, coordinating between responses

Q: (to Brian) speechwriters: how do you study rhetoric and get people accept what you say?

- Style of writing you practice, three-part lists, contrasts, rhetorical questions, short sentences - you've mastered rhetoric if you can translate your message to that form

Q: (to Tim) what tools does Google have to offer?

- Ability to interact w people on global scale: 7 platforms with over 1 billion users
- Challenge of connecting the disconnected to the internet: Google puts effort into understanding local cultures, local economies, and the needs in a local context

(Jim responds)

- Motorola has a different perspective – the primary challenge is providing tools to state and local governments
- Tools include extend community policing, tipping software, investigation, equipping UAVs and their potential, employing IOTs
- 90% data on earth generated in last 2 years, - tactical/practical focus on using and leveraging data in a way that brings value to state and local government disaster preparedness mobilization, more practical to use non-structure non-linear data

(Ted responds)

- Governments in cities, towns, etc. need to be hiring data scientists and engineers, though there is the problem of resources/money and training
- Educational institutions need to supply data scientists

Q : (to George) How to translate data into credible message

- General reliance on traditional/social media, importance of having the right information that can be distilled, correct the record, human issues to deal with

Session 3

Topic: Database Needs of End-Users

Alejandro Albanez Rivas, CPOST Associate Director for Data and Research Operations on conceptualizing a database:

- There's a difference between repository and compendium
- Database should always be changing, evolving with threats
- You need proper database-structure, paper or excel spreadsheets aren't good enough
- What is the utility of a database? How can these databases help its users? How can we create value for cities?

Brunswick Group:

- Necessary to approach the problem from a metropolitan point of view
- Think about digital geography, the digital city
- Can know the physical geography of those radicalized and attacks as well
- Metadata from search engines and other digital platforms can tell us a lot about what people in our city, neighborhoods are doing
- Need to map the digital geography of the city
- Not secretive or surveillance, just need to be used for proper purposes
- Content in social media is also presence, radicalism can easily be spread through it, has potential for immediate contact between people and propagandists
- Knowing the digital geography of the city helps selectively target problem-areas and neighborhoods
- Three things to consider:
 - Communications: Occupy the space with government experts and ministers very quickly after incidence, perhaps leave room for outsiders like Prof. Pape to comment and try to help, but have to remain preparedness on the local level
 - Technology: Cities increasingly do cyber defense on their own cities, so applying that to this issue shouldn't be too much of a challenge from a tech standpoint
 - Human Network: Something very powerful about the human network (and how they react to terrorist incidents) that is worth considering alongside the database

Neil from UL:

- Point of view from engineer, business development
- What pieces of information should be prioritized? How do we serve the end-users?
- How can we have this conference's benefits continue afterwards? What are the most essential pieces of information?
- We need a single owner to keep it up to date, make sure it's relevant and easily accessible

Mark from Deloitte Consulting:

- Assume the end-users are operators at municipal level, police, fire, emergency management; those who respond to terrorist attacks
- Good practices and standards need to be made accessible to those working at the municipal level, not necessarily the policy community
- Why should the operator use this database? Perhaps database should include contacts for various challenges
- Mapping assets could be extremely useful in the event of an attack, knowing what assets neighboring cities and towns have are crucial for rapid response
- What are the sources of information here? Are they getting to the right people?
- How can municipalities rely on the private sector for their needs?
- Usability: How can we present the information in the most effective way?

Jim, Motorola:

- We need to establish the differences between information and intelligence
- What tools can we use to reduce risk and increase safe outcomes on the decision-making level?
- Essential to ensure that first responders have all the information they need to succeed on a case-by-case basis

- 911 phone services are a critical piece of infrastructure, access to data from 911 calls can help us understand the situation better and respond quicker
- As data gets more refined, we can do a lot more with traditional data to provide superior outcomes
- Video sharing and video analytics have been developing rapidly over the past few decades
- Sharing video on the ground to first responders can help them better understand the situation
- Look at a person's situation, relationship to the environment, need to go about it intelligently though, not just a row of screens
- Facial recognition can be extremely useful for targeting high-level threats before they get into position to do harm

Drill: Participants in groups detailed three things to go into the database

- Tremendous amount of consensus on what each database needs
- Group 1:
 - Spoke about the importance of analytics; law enforcement needs to know if there will be a second attacks, having video analytics within the hour will be very helpful and help identify who the terrorist was, if they were working in a group, etc
 - Tel Aviv delegation points out that a large amount (15%) of the population may not have access to digital communication resources, need inclusive communication
 - Boston delegation points to the importance of knowing what infrastructure is available, particularly in close proximity to the area of attack
- Group 2:
 - Learning from events that has happened and understanding preventative measures; learning from near misses
 - Trying to classify before, during, and after the attack; what led up to it, and what needs to be done afterwards to bring our city back to normal
- Group 3:
 - Need to be very inclusive in describing best practices to others
 - Should look towards international and national cooperation on these issues
 - Should invite private partners to help and focus on making data comprehensible and cohesive
- Group submitted notes:
 - Group 1
 - Short term: Analytics, including video analytics, social media, secondary attacks/Lone Wolf
 - Medium term: visibility of resources, including critical infrastructure (local and national)
 - Long term: Demographics, to include elderly, infirm, deaf, children – who needs support.
 - Group 2:

- Communications: cities (critical interest); international, national, regional; long term plan beyond incident management
 - Access/utilize commercially available data to prevent crime/terror acts, evidence.
 - Integration of different data sources: International, making use of traditional sources
- Group 3:
 - Information on events that were thwarted – lessons learned
- Lessons learned from previous [successful] events
- Any information on before, during, and after

Feedback and discussion:

- Graham (from group 3):
 - It's necessary to safeguard against those who can fall off of society (mental health, law run-ins, etc.) but that data is protected by the law; can that personal information be applied to these situations?
 - Should focus on attacking self-radicalization through internet resources
- Ted:
 - Google believes in openness and sharing data to make it useful, but information is heavily guarded by entities
 - Very high psychological hurdle for organizations to overcome, but could be extremely useful for addressing the problem
- Moderator:
 - How can we interface and integrate digital and analogue data? Can we make something universal despite technology differences between cities around the world?
- Casablanca:
 - There needs to be a specific application to each country and to its social and cultural situation; what works in the US won't necessarily work in Morocco, including the way we present and handle the information
- Glasgow:
 - Don't forget about the information and collaboration available in the private sector; sit down with airport, law enforcement, border patrols, etc. to get a situation from those on the ground, take a global look at the problem
 - How can we involve the general public as well?
 - Story of bad information getting out into the media/public (Glasgow Airport attacks):
 - World's media descended upon airport within 30-60 minutes desperate to know what happened
 - Police handled situation very early on, tackled offenders but worker in airport claimed he tackled the offender, which got popularized in the media and grew into a story of its own, despite lacking evidence
 - Need to address incentivization and media standards in these types of situations

Wrap-up session:

- Michelle:
 - Past work of conference showed commitment and importance of local involvement on these security issues
 - Will readdress Security Council and indicate that the conference will result in something bigger, a database/product that will continue the conference's work going forward
 - The key word is preparedness, particularly in small cities which are affected by these attacks
 - If we want to be successful, these activities need to start at the bottom, at the local level, and learn from the mistakes from the past
 - Municipalities should run the show on the local database, need to emphasize the practicalities of on-the-ground leadership

- Professor Pape:
 - Thankful for personal contact and experience on the local level
 - There's no way that a database is going to be used on a day of the attack during the initial rapid response
 - We need to build a database that will feed into table-top exercises, in the instance that they have time to properly use a database
 - Need to get away from practices, and move towards principles more applicable to the operational level
 - Past experiences, especially in detail, could be very helpful in this situation, help understand what happens during the flow of the attack and the days just after
 - Products could also be useful, but need to keep in mind where they really matter, helpful with tabletop exercises
 - Want to develop this table-top training database by June
 - Need some help however: El Paso-level detailed briefing of how cities respond to these attacks, in order to inform and develop a toolkit for table-top exercises in other cities
 - Contacts are not as useful when they're not well-known and easily accessible on the day of the attack, personal contacts instead of a contact list would be more helpful for rapid response

- Thoughts/responses to Bob's ideas:
 - Great to focus on preparation, absolutely essential for prevention and proper response
 - At the local-level, it's difficult to get solid data and relations for table-top so there's a need for public-private cooperation
 - We need to make sure our understanding of attacks is able to evolve as they evolve (drones, chemicals, etc)
 - Table-topping going forward might have to be virtual for it to be most effective, places that need it most are those places with limited resources

- Google: Videoconferencing can be a very cost-effective way to make these contacts and do these simulations, even if it's not quite the same as in-person meetings
 - Importance should be on applying the lessons of past attacks to present situations, many concepts and principles of the attacks don't change
 - Need to understand the creative element of certain attacks
 - Paris would be happy to implement these security principles
 - Expand the word products: If the city is the start-point, then products for non-cities and other social situations would not be extremely helpful
 - You can't just take the products as taken, need to focus on city-level application
- Michelle:
 - We need to tailor our solutions for the situation, particularly on the local level, but also need to unite our resources and embrace public-private partnership to counter the issue.



CHICAGO PROJECT ON
SECURITY & THREATS



CTED

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTORATE

UN CTED + CPOST

Uniting Against the Next Attack

• *Seeking Solutions* • *Sharing Answers*

The 2019 UN CTED + CPOST colloquium will draw on the experiences, insights and knowledge of public officials, scholars, and experts from around the world with an eye to pathbreaking research to:

1. Create a database and compendium of good practice and scalable solutions based on research and lessons learned.
2. Raise awareness globally of the importance of building resilience and international coordination at the municipal level.

Why a colloquium?

By conducting a colloquium CPOST will be able to capture vital information to research and develop practical scalable solutions and good practices.

"Colloquium" is a Latin derivative for an informal meeting or seminar which is usually of an academic nature with different scholars/lecturers/specialist meeting for discussion.

While there may be some short presentations to set the agenda, the main activity will be through discussions and panels to draw out relevant information to guide the final outcomes.

Each city has been selected for their unique experience and insights in terrorism. Some have elected to send additional delegates at their own cost. Around the room there will also be "back benchers" who rather than participating in the discussions will be observing to capture information needed to develop content for the database and other material.

What is a Chatham House meeting?

The meeting will conclude with a Chatham House discussion. Chatham House is a rule or principle according to which information disclosed during a meeting may be reported or used by those present, but the source of that information may not be explicitly or implicitly identified in order to encourage frank and open discussion.

Agenda

Weclome reception: November 21,

Time

5.30pm – 7.00pm

Venue

The Salon, Alliance Française de Chicago

Entrance at 54 West Chicago Avenue, Chicago, IL 60654 (two doors west of Dearborn).

Dress

Business attire

Keynote address

Paddy McGuinness, former UK Deputy National Security Adviser, for Intelligence, Security and Resilience



Mr McGuinness was formerly the UK's Deputy National Security Adviser, for Intelligence, Security and Resilience where he advised the Prime Minister and National Security Council on policy and decision-making on homeland security issues, including national resilience and crisis response, cyber security, counter-terrorism, and the UK's response to action by hostile states. In this role Mr McGuinness worked with senior UK officials from across government, senior business figures and foreign partners, to build a coalition of common interests that broadened the UK's national security capabilities and reach. Mr McGuinness was previously in the Diplomatic Service with leadership roles in the Middle East and Africa, Counter-Terrorism, Counter-Proliferation, and aspects of Cyber. He served in British Embassies in Rome, Cairo, Abu Dhabi and Sana'a.

Colloquium DAY ONE: November 22

Time

9.00am – 5.00pm

Venue

The Quadrangle Club
University of Chicago
1155 E 57th St, Chicago, IL 60637, United States

Keynote address: Threats to Cities

Russell “Russ” Travers, Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC)



Russell “Russ” Travers took office as the Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) on Aug. 16, 2019. Serving as Deputy Director since Nov. 13, 2017, he previously served as Acting Director during the confirmation process for Joe Maguire Dec. 2017 to Dec. 2018. Mr. Travers also held other leadership positions within NCTC between 2015 and 2017, including Senior Counselor to the Director, Acting Director of the Office of Data Strategy and Innovation, and the Chief Data Officer for both NCTC and ODNI.

Colloquium Program

Start	Finish	Topic	Presenter/Participant
0900	0930	Why soft targets need defending UN stance and specifically the protection of soft targets.	Michèle Coninx , Assistant Secretary-General & Executive Director, United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)
0930	1015	The threats to cities Presentation on diverse threat cities can expect, followed by moderated discussion between Mr Travers and Professor Pape.	Russell “Russ” Travers , Acting Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Professor Robert Pape , Director, University of Chicago Project on Security & Threats (CPOST)
1015	1100	Now and into the near future: Research + context The threat landscape from a research perspective.	Keven Ruby, Ph.D, + Researchers Research Director, University of Chicago Project on Security and Threats (CPOST) Researchers: Julia Lodoen, Rahma Bayrakdar, Sedef Ishaque, Alexandra Chinchilla, Bettina Hammer Wendin Smith, PhD , Managing Director Deloitte Consulting LLP
1100	1120		Break

1120	1215	Lessons Learned 1 Cities discuss experiences and insights and what happens after an attack.	Discussion with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ankara • Casablanca • Paris
1215	1300	Lessons Learned 2 Cities discuss experiences and insights and what happens after an attack.	Discussion with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Boston • Bali • Glasgow
1300	1400	Lunch	
1400	1440	Better living through security Good practices from first tier cities, exploring information sharing, public private partnerships and communications.	Discussion with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Graham Ellis, Assistant Commissioner, Operational Resilience / Special Operations Group, London Fire Brigade • Lieutenant Patrick T. Quinn, Chicago Police Department, Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC) • Daniel R. William, FBI Chicago Field Office
1440	1520	Case study: responding not reacting Facilitating cooperation to ensure urban safety and security.	Brian Hanson , Vice President for Research, Chicago Council on Global Affairs talks with representatives from Tel Aviv
1520	1540	Break	
1540	1620	Scalable solutions: Standards as a tool How standards can be used as for more than a compliance.	Discussion with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Chris Hasbrook, Vice President and General Manager of the Building and Life Safety Technologies Division of <i>UL</i> LLC • Patrick Butor, Administrateur General, French Cabinet du Secetaire General • Paul McCarthy, Global Security Architect, Amazon Web Services
1620	1700	Scalable solutions: Information sharing Crossing the local, national, international, government and business divides.	Discussion with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrick "Paddy" McGuinness CMG OBE former UK Deputy National Security Adviser for Intelligence. • Bruce C. Swartz, Deputy Assistant Attorney General and and Counselor for International Affairs, US Department of Justice.
17:00 Close of Day One			

DAY TWO: November 23

Time

9.00am – 4.00pm

Venue

The Quadrangle Club
University of Chicago
1155 E 57th St, Chicago, IL 60637, United States

Start	Finish	Topic	Presenter/Participants
0900	0940	Case study: Facing an attack El Paso's city's response to terror.	Special presentation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Dionne Mack, Deputy City Manager, Public Safety, El Paso • Mario D'Agostino, Fire Chief, El Paso • Jorge Rodriguez, Deputy Chief/Emergency Management Coordinator; El Paso City/County Office of Emergency
0940	1020	Scalable solutions: Public Communications Who should talk, what they need to say and how to communicate in the digital age.	Discussion with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • George Little, Brunswick Group • Brian Jenner, UK Speechwriters Guild • Ted Souder, Google
1020	1040	Break	
1040	1120	Chatham House meeting Scalable solutions database content suggestions	All delegates
1120	1210	Chatham House meeting Scalable solutions database next steps	All delegates
1210	1300	Closing discussion	Michèle Coninsx , Assistant Secretary-General & Executive Director, United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED) Professor Robert Pape , Director, University of Chicago Project on Security & Threats (CPOST)
1300	1345	Lunch	
1345	1400	Transport to Fusion Center	
1400	1600	Chicago Crime Prevention Information Center (CPIC) CPIC is one of more than 40 "fusion" centers that state and local law enforcement operate to prevent terrorist attacks and to respond to natural disasters instantaneously. Better integration of the various streams of information and intelligence, including that data from the federal government, state, local and tribal governments, as well as the private sector, create a more accurate picture of risks to people, economic infrastructure and communities can be and translated into protective action.	